Subjective science: environmental cost-benefit analysis. by Schmidt, Charles W
L
ast February, in a legislative proposal to reduce power plant
emissions, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
suggested that the economic value of saving the elderly from
early death caused by air pollution was less than that of saving healthy
adults. Two cost–benefit analyses for the rule, known as the Clear
Skies initiative, were presented by the agency. A base analysis without
the so-called “senior discount” yielded benefits of $93 billion. But an
alternative analysis in which this age-adjusted factor was applied pro-
duced a much lower benefit of just $11 billion, barely twice the cost
of the program. According to Reece Rushing, a policy analyst with
the Washington, D.C.–based public interest group OMB Watch,
health-protective regulations may not be adopted if benefits appear
low relative to cost. 
The backlash against the senior discount was swift and severe.
Advocacy groups, religious organizations, and critics including former
EPA administrator Carol M. Browner blasted the agency, charging that
it had undervalued aging Americans in its benefits calculations.
Under fire, the EPA withdrew the alternative analysis in May. But
while the senior discount may have been shelved for now, cost–benefit
analysis for environmental rule making under the Bush administration
remains controversial. 
At the core of this issue is the growing influence of the White
House office with responsibility for cost–benefit review: the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), within the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). Traditionally, OIRA has had fairly
minimal interactions with submitting agencies as they prepare
cost–benefit analyses. But under its current administrator, John
Graham, OIRA has become intimately involved in all aspects of the
cost–benefit process.
Stacking the Deck
Although his technical abilities are highly regarded, Graham’s rela-
tionship with environmentalists is complicated by his industry associ-
ations. Prior to taking the reins at OIRA in July 2001, Graham
directed the Harvard University Center for Risk Analysis, an organi-
zation that applies cost–benefit research to health and environmental
decision making. Nearly 60% of the center’s budget during Graham’s
tenure was supplied by corporate sponsors, including chemical com-
panies such as Monsanto and Union Carbide. 
Today, Graham is among the most powerful environmental offi-
cials in the country: all health and environmental rules valued at
$100 million or more cross his desk before they go into force. During
the eight years of the Clinton administration, OIRA sent 16 rules
back to agencies for rewriting. Graham sent back 19 rules (not all of
which were environmental) during his first year alone.
OIRA’s growing participation in the cost–benefit process has
drawn mixed reactions from EPA officials. Some welcome the infusion
of new science they say OIRA brings to the process. For instance, Al
McGartland, director of the EPA National Center for Environmental
Economics, suggests the collaborations foster innovation on new meth-
ods and approaches. But other officials say OIRA has become exces-
sively intrusive. Critics also suggest that OIRA’s involvement in the
cost–benefit process itself undermines the office’s ability to perform an
objective review of the outcome, going against the purpose of having
OMB as an independent review body.
In a further divergence from past practices, OIRA has also begun
to critique the science behind proposed rules in addition to the eco-
nomics assumptions. Once staffed mainly by economists and policy
analysts, OIRA now also employs a variety of health and environmen-
tal scientists, present at Graham’s request. Among them are Margo
Schwab, an epidemiologist previously with the Johns Hopkins
Bloomberg School of Public Health, and Nancy Beck, a toxicologist
drawn from the EPA National Center for Environmental Assessment.
“OIRA’s investment in science and engineering has permitted us to
ask more informed and penetrating questions about regulatory pro-
posals,” Graham says. “It has also allowed us to communicate more
effectively with agency specialists.”
The addition of scientists to OIRA’s staff is another source of con-
troversy. Rushing says OIRA is overstepping its legislative mandate
because health and environmental expertise should be concentrated in
the agencies that draft legislation. “It’s clear that OIRA wants to ques-
tion agency science in the same way they want to question agency
cost–benefit analysis,” he says. 
Alan Krupnick, a senior fellow with the Washington, D.C.–based
research organization Resources for the Future (RFF), disagrees. “I
think it’s a great idea,” he says. “Why should OIRA’s review of EPA
studies be limited to the quality of their economic analyses? OIRA
could help with the science as well. Looking at this logically rather than
bureaucratically, it seems like a good thing to do.” 
Guidelines and Measures
Many of OIRA’s proposed methods changes are described in draft
OMB guidelines titled “2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and
Benefits of Federal Regulations,” published in the 3 February 2003
issue of the Federal Register. The guidelines, currently under review,
are expected to be finalized in the fall. A key goal of the draft
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tguidelines is to expand on the economic
methods used to valuate the health benefits
of proposed rules.
The EPA currently quantifies health ben-
efits using a metric called the value of a sta-
tistical life (VSL). The VSL is derived mainly
from two types of studies: surveys that
inquire how much individuals are willing to
pay for a reduction in the risk of early death,
and studies on the difference in wages
between high- and low-risk jobs among
workers of the same age and health status—
that is, the compensatory “wage premium”
paid to high-risk workers. 
Scientists use the resultant data in calcu-
lations that determine the VSL for a given
population. The EPA’s calculated VSL,
based on 26 separate studies (mainly wage
studies), is $6.1 million. Specifically, this
figure is an estimate of the amount that a
population is willing to pay to save a single
hypothetical person (i.e., the statistical life)
from dying prematurely. To quantify the
benefits of a proposed rule, scientists multi-
ply the VSL by the number of people that
the rule is expected to save. 
Critics, including Graham, suggest that,
as it is currently used, the VSL’s limitations
distort environmental benefits calculations.
For instance, because it is based largely on
labor market studies that address the risk of
accidental death, the VSL may be inappro-
priate for valuating the lives of nonoccupa-
tional populations, including those who are
most vulnerable to environmental pollution,
such as the elderly, says Bryan Hubbell, an
economist in the EPA Office of Air Quality
Planning and Standards. The age-adjusted
factor used in the Clear Skies analysis was an
attempt to correct for this discrepancy,
Hubbell says. 
At OIRA’s urging, the EPA revised its
VSL using new willingness-to-pay data col-
lected from surveys in the United Kingdom
and Canada. But these studies found that
seniors would pay approximately 35% less for
risk reductions than would healthy adults.
Therefore, the VSL applied to elderly popula-
tions under the Clear Skies initiative was
commensurately lower ($3.7 million) than
the standard VSL of $6.1 million applied by
the EPA to the rest of the population. 
Environmental groups seized on this
analysis as evidence that OIRA and Graham
were making subjective decisions about the
living value of one group versus another—a
charge OIRA officials vehemently deny. In
the midst of this uproar, EPA and OIRA
officials quietly revisited the Canadian and
U.K. data and found them to be unaccept-
able in quality. Furthermore, a willingness-
to-pay analysis of U.S. seniors performed by
RFF could not replicate the age-adjusted fac-
tor derived from the U.K. data. And so in a
memorandum to the President’s Manage-
ment Council dated 30 May 2003, Graham
formally advised the EPA and other agencies
to “discontinue use of this factor as an
adjustment to the economic value of a statis-
tical life.”
In the meantime, critics are increasingly
claiming the VSL is a flawed tool. In gener-
al, the public tends to be uncomfortable
with the whole notion of assigning dollar
values to life and health. And VSLs vary
widely depending upon the studies from
which they are derived. The Food and Drug
Administration’s VSL, for instance, is $5
million. RFF has conducted willingness-to-
pay surveys in the United States and Canada
that identify VSLs ranging from $1 million
to $3 million. Are any of these values more
valid than the others? Experts concede this is
a difficult question to answer. “OMB is con-
cerned that agencies are using different VSL
figures without clear justifications for the
variability,” Graham says. “[Therefore],
OMB is encouraging agencies to discuss
these issues and find the most technically
reasonable figures.” 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
OMB’s draft guidelines propose an alterna-
tive approach that foregoes the economic
valuation of life altogether. This approach,
which has a long history in public health, is
called cost-effectiveness analysis. In cost-
effectiveness analysis, scientists quantify the
benefits of proposed legislation not by the
economic value of the lives it saves but by
the life years it saves in the population as a
whole. Public health experts call this the
“effect on life expectancy.” Graham
explains, “A rule that adds an expected ten
years of life for at-risk individuals may
deserve greater priority than a rule that adds
only one year of life.” 
According to Hubbell, scientists calculate
life years saved by first determining the risk
of mortality from a given environmental
threat according to both age and health sta-
tus, then estimating the resultant life years
lost from the population. The inverse of that
figure represents the life years saved if the
threat is eliminated. For instance, assuming a
natural life span of 75 years, a reduction in
air pollution that saves a 50-year-old and a
70-year-old can be said to have saved 30 life
years (25 years for the 50-year-old and 5
years for the 70-year-old). This approach
allows regulators to rank regulatory options
that protect public health according to the
life years the options predict will be saved.
Graham emphasizes that the draft guide-
lines don’t call for abandonment of the
VSL, a deeply entrenched value still favored
by many stakeholders. Rather, they propose
that it be combined with cost-effectiveness
analyses so that agency administrators can
compare policy options and approve those
that give the most bang for the buck in
terms of health protections. 
According to Hubbell, the life years
approach has a key drawback, however: it
assumes that individuals will value life years
in the same way, regardless of the status of
their health or their remaining life expectan-
cy. Economists have sought to account for
these quality-of-life parameters with a variety
of controversial techniques. 
Although not proposed in the current
draft guidelines, Graham has suggested that
quality-of-life measures can be incorporated
into agency cost–benefit evaluations.
Specifically, remaining life years can be
weighted according to subjective valuations
regarding their overall quality, he says. The
key measures in these analyses are quality-
adjusted life years (QALYs)—the dominant
metric in the public health economics field,
says McGartland—which are derived from
surveys of how different age and disease
groups rate the quality of their existence.
Zero represents death, and 1 describes a state
of perfect health. A QALY of 0.5 might
therefore be applied to the life year of some-
one with chronic lung disease. So a policy
that saves 10,000 people with such an illness
would be predicted to yield 5,000 QALYs. 
Most stakeholders tend to agree that
cost-effectiveness approaches can be useful.
But not surprisingly, the QALY approach
has its own numerous detractors. For exam-
ple, Wesley Warren, a senior fellow for envi-
ronmental economics at the Natural
Resources Defense Council, claims the
approach is nonviable, slamming it as
“voodoo economics.” At present, OIRA is
working with the Institute of Medicine to
examine the advantages of QALYs and other
alternative measures, Graham says. 
In the meantime, it is clear that
cost–benefit approaches as they apply to
environmental rule making are evolving and
becoming more sophisticated. The extent to
which they actually lead to better decisions
that protect public health is likely to be
debated extensively throughout the remain-
der of the Bush presidency and beyond.
“Ultimately, OIRA under Graham is shining
a bright light on procedures that have previ-
ously been taken for granted, and that’s a
good thing,” says Krupnick. “It’s good to get
better science into the rule-making analysis.
Some see a problem in that these newer
approaches are pointing us in a downward
direction in terms of benefits estimations.
However, what is needed is a debate over
appropriate procedures for ranking policies
that improve health.” 
Charles W. Schmidt
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